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Due to the limited nature of Erlich, it would not be irreconcilable with such
a rule. Conditions were such that the court seemed to imply that damages could
have been shown more explicitly.43 The exercise of such discretion would clearly
be within the recommended standard. It is to be hoped that such limiting factors
will not be overlooked by future courts and that the strict requirement of special
damages in trade libel cases will be modified in such a manner so as to be con-
sistent with present business conditions and public policy.
John It. Ball*
43 224 Cal. App. 2d at 74-75, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 259-60.
*Member, Second Year Class.
"WRONGFUL LIFE"-A NEW TORT?-Williams v. State
Williams v. State1 is an action brought by Frank Williams as guardian ad litem
for Christine Williams, an infant, and for Lorene Williams, an incompetent adult.
While confined at Manhattan State Hospital, Lorene Williams was allegedly sex-
ually assaulted as a result of defendant's negligent supervision, resulting in Christine
Williams being conceived and bom out of wedlock to a mentally deficient mother.
Lorene Williams and Christine Williams each brought separate actions. At present
the State does not contest the cause of action of its patient, Lorene Williams.
However, when Christine Williams, alleging deprivation of property, normal child-
hood, normal life, proper parental care and support, and also alleging a burden of
bearing the stigma of illegitimacy, sought 100,000 dollars in damages, the State
moved to dismiss the plaintiff's cause of action as insufficient. Despite the fact that
at the time of the State's alleged negligence plaintiff was not yet conceived, the
court concluded that plaintiffs injury was reasonably foreseeable and that the State
owed a duty to its patient and to her potential issue. The court therefore demed
defendant's motion, holding that plaintiff had a cause of action and was entitled to
a trial.
Negligence, the Prerequisites
Christine Williams seeks recovery of damages resulting from negligence. The
courts have developed four prerequisites to a successful cause of action for negli-
gence: 2 a legal duty not to subject plaintiff to unreasonable risk, a breach of that
duty, a close causal connection between defendant's conduct and plaintiffs result-
ing injury, and actual loss or damage to plaintiff.
The final two requirements, close causal connection and damages, can be
quickly disposed of since they are matters to be proved at trial, while the opinion
146 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1965), noted, 18 STAr. L. REv. 530
(1966).
2 tossmn, ToRTs 146 (3d ed. 1964).
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under discussion concerns only a motion to dismiss. It would seem that plaintiffs
case is sufficient to allow her to present evidence of a close causal connection to
the jury. The assault is not an independent intervening cause, for plaintiff is suing
on the assumption that the State is responsible for the conditions which permitted
the intentional tort to occur.3 Whether the resulting injury to plaintiff was fore-
seeable or not is a question of fact for the trier of fact.4
The last requirement, damages, could be an obstacle to recovery. The court
confined itself strictly to the pleaded matters and did not delve into this area of
the problem which could be the most intricate. It has been argued that one in this
plaintiffs position has not been damaged at all,5 and actual damages are a necessary
part of a cause of action for negligence. 6 Furthermore, many of plaintiffs alleged
injuries, most notably deprivation of property, appear to involve pecuniary loss,7
and "stigma of illegitimacy" has the appearance of mental disturbance without ac-
companying physical injury.8 Plaintiff may find herself without a reasonable basis
for an estimation of these damages.2
Duty, the First Prerequisite
The crux of the Williams decision is the prerequisite duty. The New York Court
of Claims has, in effect, held that Christine Williams satisfied this requirement.1o
The term duty, as here discussed, is confined to its use in the area of negligence.
There is a broader concept of duty present in any tort, e.g., a duty toward the
whole world not to commit assault and battery. But, as specifically applied to negli-
gence, duty is a legal obligation to take care, owed by the defendant to a particular
plaintiff. A statement of Lord Esher is most often quoted to explain this concept:
"The question of liability for negligence cannot arise at all until it is established
that the man who has been negligent owed some duty to the person who seeks to
3 Neering v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 383 IlI. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943).
4 Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v. Kellog, 94 U.S. 499 (1876).
5 Comment, 49 IowA. L. BEv. 1005 (1964) (better a live bastard than never to have
existed).
0 Commercial Bank of Albany v. Ten Eyck, 48 N.Y. 305 (1872).
7In negligence cases courts are reluctant to grant damages for purely pecuniary loss
without an accompanying tangible damage to the person or property. Pnossan, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 663, 721-724, 962-967, 976-977.8 To date, with several exceptions not here important, courts will not award damages
for purely mental distress, negligently caused, without accompanying physical injury.
Annot., 64 A.L.R. 2d 100, 117 (1959).
0 A reasonable basis for an estimate of damages with some exactness is essential.
McCowmIci, DaAOcEs 99 (1935).
10 Judge Squire, in writing the opinion of the court, spoke in terms of a "foreseeable
duty." Although an unusual way of expressing it, it would seem that he is concluding that
plaintiff is not in the position of Mrs. Palsgraf. In Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y.
339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), unknown to defendant's servants, a passenger was carrying a
package of fireworks which slipped out of his hands while defendant's servants negli-
gently assisted him in boarding the train. The fireworks exploded, the concussion causing
scales on the platform to fall on Mrs. Palsgraf. Chief Judge Cardozo, writing for the
majority, concluded that Mrs. Palsgraf was an unforeseeable plaintiff and therefore there
was no actionable negligence'toward her. Unless it can be said that children are not the
foreseeable consequence of rape, Judge Squire's conclusion would seem to be justified.
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make him liable for his negligence.... A man is entitled to be as negligent as he
pleases towards the whole world if he owes no duty to them."'1
The requirement of duty is of comparatively recent origin.' 2 At that period in
common law when contract and tort were slowly being disentangled and negligence
was developing as a separate tort, the concept of duty innocuously began to appear
in decisions. Commencing with opinions holding that the obligation of contract
could give no right of action to one not privy to the contract, this concept was
gradually extended to the whole field of negligence.' 3 By 1883, duty had solidified
into an essential requirement of the law of negligence.' 4
Duty Between Conception and Birth
The idea that a tort could be committed against a child between conception and
birth and thus that a duty could exist toward that child, was first put forward in
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton.'5 While four to five months pregnant with
deceased, deceased's mother fell as a result of defendant's negligence, causing an
abortion of the pregnancy. The premature child died within ten or fifteen minutes.
Justice Holmes refused to concede that the deceased child could be the victim of
a tort. The jurist reasoned that until birth the child was not a person recognized by
law so that defendant owed him no duty prior to birth. Until 1946, Holmes' opinion
represented the overwhelming weight of authority as to prenatal injuries.16
In 1946, Bonbrest v. Kotz17 held that a child en ventre sa mere'8 was a human
being capable of suffering tortious physical injury. Plaintiff was injured during
birth, and the case was distinguished from Dietrich on the ground that plaintiff was
a viable being at the time of injury. In an effort to escape the scope of Dietrich
many courts have adopted the Bonbrest test of viability.' 9 Since the point at which
11 Le Lievre v. Gould, [18931 1 Q.B. 491, 497.
12 Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 34 CoLum. L. REv. 41 (1934).
13 A series of three cases is generally considered as the origin of the requirement of
duty in negligence actions. Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490
(1837); Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (1837) and Winterbot-
tom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
14 Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883).
15 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
16 Attack in earnest on the flat denial of recovery was begun by Justice Boggs in a
dissenting opinion in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900). He
distinguished Allaire from Dietrich on the grounds that the child in Dietrich was not
viable. Prior to 1946 California and Louisiana granted recovery on the basis of statutory
language. Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939); Cooper v.
Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923). Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (1924),
granted recovery to the victim of a prenatal injury but was in effect overruled by Berlin
v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940). Despite the lack of precedent,
Canada in 1933 granted recovery for an injury which occurred while plaintiff's mother
was seven months pregnant. Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, [1933] Can. Sup. Ct. 456,
[19331 4 D.L.R. 337.
17 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
'8 In its mother's womb.
19 Bonbrest marked the beginning of a revolution. Only three states, Alabama, Rhode
Island and Texas, have yet to overrule decisions following Dietrich. PTossia, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 356. New York followed Dietrich in Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220,
133 N.E. 567 (1921). This was overruled in 1951 by Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349,
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viability occurs varies with the individual circumstances,20 it is doubtful that in the
future the courts can continue to draw this distinction. A number of decisions have
granted recovery in cases involving only a short length of time between conception
and injury, thus expressly or impliedly dispensing with any requirement of
viability.21
Duty at or Prior to Conception
The State argued that its alleged negligence was not a continuing tort and there-
fore the negligent act was completed before the assault. If this is accepted, then it
follows that plaintiff's cause of action can be successful only if the State owed a
duty to plaintiff prior to her conception. Even if there were a continuing tort the
only difference would be that the State must have owed a duty to plaintiff at, as
opposed to prior to, conception.
Plaintiff lacks authority for the argument that a duty can exist toward a non-
existent person. Two cases, Zepeda v. Zepeda2 2 and Piper v. Hoard,23 at first glance
appear to be pertinent. In Zepeda, the defendant, who was already married, se-
duced plaintiffs mother with promises of marriage. Plaintiff was consequently born
an adulterine bastard and brought an action which, for purposes of argument, was
called an action for wrongful life. The court had little difficulty in recognizing that
plaintiff suffered damages as a proximate result of defendant's tortious acts. How-
ever, fearing a flood of litigation, it balked at granting relief, reasoning that this was
more properly a legislative than a judicial matter.24 In Piper, prior to plaintiff's
conception, defendant made certain fraudulent representations to plaintiff's mother
concerning plaintiff's interest in real property held by defendant. Plaintiff sought
to have defendant declared trustee ex malefcio of the property, which plaintiff
would own had the representations been true. Recovery was granted, despite the
fact that plaintiff was not in existence at the time of the tort.
The significance of these two cases is obvious. Zepeda involved a tort at or
immediately prior to conception; Piper involved a tort a considerable time before
conception. However, neither is precedent for Christine Williams' cause of action,
for unlike these two cases, Williams was based upon negligence. In Piper the tort
was fraudulent misrepresentation, an intentional tort. Intentional torts do not in-
volve the same problem of duty as does negligence. Because intentional torts involve
the broader concept of duty which is owed to the whole world rather than to a spe-
102 N.E.2d 691 (1951), the court placing considerable reliance upon the viability of
plaintiff at the time of the injury.20 CRNHrr, OBrrSrMcs (13th ed. 1965).
21 At least the following have dispensed with any requirement of viability: Hom-
buckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956) (6 weeks);
Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961) (1 month); Bennett v.
Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d
497 (1960); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953) (3 months);
Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) (1 month); Puhl v. Milwaukee
Automobile Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959) (dictum).
2241 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963).
23 107 N.Y. 73, 13 N.E. 626 (1887).
24 In Williams the defendant argued that to recognize that the State, which at most
was indirectly responsible for the alleged damages, is liable when an action for wrong-
ful life against the father is denied is contradictory. Since Judge Squire criticized Zepeda
for denying relief, this argument carried little weight.
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cific individual the intent can be transferred.25 Negligence requires a duty toward
a particular plaintiff which cannot be transferred. In Zepeda the court called the
defendant's acts "wilful in that defendant was completely indifferent to the foresee-
able consequences ....- 26 Wilful conduct falls somewhere between negligence,
which is unreasonable risk of harm to another, and intent, which is knowledge that
the harm is substantially certain to follow.27 One writer has described it as "quasi-
intentional conduct."28 While transferred intent cannot be applied to such a case,
neither need the narrow concept of duty, necessary in negligence cases, be applied.
Thus like Piper, Zepeda is not authority for Christine Williams' cause of action. 29
Not only does plaintiff lack authority for the proposition that the State could
have owed a duty to a nonexistent plaintiff, but it is difficult to see how such a duty
could exist. Holmes had the same difficulty. He called the child en ventre sa mere
a nonexistent plaintiff and concluded that no duty could exist. Yet, as seen, his
reasoning has been discarded. It would thus seem to be inviting criticism to end
this discussion with the conclusion that it is impossible for a duty to be owed to a
nonexistent plaintiff.
Dean Prosser argues that the statement that there is or is not a duty is a short-
hand statement of a conclusion rather than an aid to analysis in itself.30 "'[Diuty'
is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considera-
tions of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to
protection."31 He continues: "No better general statement can be made, than that
the courts will find a duty where, in general, reasonable men would recognize it
and agree it exists."32
Factors Underlying a Determination of Duty
Since the courts' finding of duty conforms to that of the reasonable man, it is
'helpful to look to the reasoning applied in related fields where the question of duty
is important and determine what standards are applied. The development of re-
covery for mental distress, the turntable doctrine,33 and recovery for prenatal in-
juries are representative.
Recovery for mental distress began as recovery for the mental anguish which
accompanies physical injury.3 4 The leading case of Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.3 5
2 5 Morrow v. Flores, 225 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
26 41 Ill. App. 2d at 247, 190 N.E.2d at 852.
27 PRosszM, op. cit. supra note 2, at 187.
2 8 Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 So. CAL. L. REv. 91, 143 (1933).
29 In common law jurisdictions only one case, Morgan v. United States, 143 F. Supp.
580 (D.N.J. 1956) has raised the possibility of pre-conceptive conduct being negligent
-with respect to a later child, but recovery was denied because the statute of limitations
had run. By way of dictum, the court observed that no recovery would be granted be-
cause applicable Pennsylvania law at that time did not recognize actions by the child
for prenatal- injuries.30 PnossER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 332.
31 Id. at 333.
32 Id. at 334.
3 3 This doctrine concerns the liability of a landowner to a trespassing child. The
early cases involved railroad turntables and hence the name "turntable doctrine."
84 Canning v. Inhabitants of Williamstown, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 451 (1848).
35151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
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denied recovery even for physical damage brought on by mental distress, in the
absence of any physical impact. The court expressed a fear of a flood of litigation,
for injury could easily be feigned and damages might be based upon mere con-
jecture. It was concluded that to grant recovery would be against public policy.
In 1961 this case was overruled by Battalla V. State,3 6 where the court held that
rigorous application of Mitchell would be both unjust and contrary to experience
and logic. Although fraud, extra litigation and a degree of speculation were con-
ceded to be possible, it was concluded that this was no reason to deny redress for
a substantial wrong. It must be noted that even in Battalla the mental distress re-
sulted in at least some physical damage, although there was no physical impact.
Using the same reasoning as Mitchell, courts presently deny recovery, as a general
rule, unless the mental disturbance results in at least some physical damage.3 7
McPheters v. Loomis3 8 held that the landowner owed no duty to the trespasser
whose presence was unknown. The court based its reasoning on the conclusion
that the landowner has dominion over the land and a greater right to its use than
does the trespasser and therefore the trespasser is to be taken to have assumed
the risk of the condition of the property. This attitude, that property rights are
superior to individual rights, is on the wane, and many restrictions are being placed
upon the landowner.3 9 Because of this de-emphasis of the importance of property
rights and because of the favored position children hold, Sioux City and Pacific
R.R. v. Stout40 held that a railroad owed a duty of reasonable care to a child
trespasser. Ryan v. Towar43 leads the opposition, holding that no such duty can
exist because of the undue burden it would place upon the traditionally favored
property owner. The Restatement of Torts, 42 which has been described as presently
representing the great weight of authority, 43 adopts the turntable doctrine but sets
out stringent prerequisites to the presence of a duty to the trespassing child.44
In the prenatal injury cases most courts denied recovery on the basis of the
Dietrich reasoning, namely, that no duty could exist prior to birth. This appears to
have been a convenient way to say that proving a causal connection between the
negligence and the injury was too difficult and hence fictitious claims were feared.45
The common denominator in all of the above appears to be what Professor
36 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 229, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
37 Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 117 (1959). This is of slight consequence since in
most cases of serious mental disturbance there are accompanying physical consequences
which the courts are quick to find.
38 125 Conn. 526, 7 A.2d 437 (1939).
39 See generally PRossM, op. cit. supra note 2, ch. 11.
40 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1874).
41 128 Mich. 463, 87 N.W. 644 (1901).
42 RSITATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 339 (1964).
43 Pnossrp, op. cit. supra note 2, at 375.
44 The property owner must know, or have reason to know, children are likely to
trespass; an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm must be involved; the
child, because of its youth, must not understand the danger; the utility of the dangerous
condition must be slight as compared to the risk involved; and the property owner must
fail to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise protect the children.
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 339 (1965).
4 5 Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); PRossEa, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 355.
NOTES
406 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Green refers to as "the administrative factor."46 "[T]here is nothing so weighty with
court-room government as the workability of a rule or a process."47 This is the final
hurdle that must be overcome before a duty will be recognized. It can be argued
that it is unjust and illogical to deny recovery for mental distress unless there has
been physical impact, but until the court is assured of protection against fraudulent
claims and unlimited liability, recovery will be refused. In liability to a trespassing
child the current social mores may demand that the child be protected, but until
the courts are convinced that the landowners liability will not be unlimited, re-
covery will be denied. Similarly, until the courts are convinced that claims can be
accurately assessed, they will refuse to recognize a duty toward a child en ventre
sa mere.
Conclusion
In light of these considerations, it is doubtful that social mores demand that
the court find that Christine Williams was owed a duty of reasonable care. Plain-
tiff's circumstances are not singular. Each day children are born with a multitude
of handicaps ranging from physical or mental to economic. However unfortunate
these burdens may be, courts as yet have not seen fit to compensate them. Is the
plight of the bastard any different?
Even if it be assumed that our ethics demand recovery, this writer submits
that plaintiff cannot overcome the administrative factor: the courts' fear of un-
reasonable burdens being placed on prospective defendants and courts. The merits
of a case cannot, and are not, determined without looking beyond the given facts
to the problems that will be raised if it becomes precedent. The law must remain
workable.
It is doubtful that in Christine Williams' case reasonable men would recognize
a duty on the part of the State toward plaintiff. The State pointed out that the
parents who permit a promiscuous daughter to consort with males might similarly
be liable to a child born to their daughter out of wedlock. The effects of a negligent
radiologist might not appear until generations later, yet liability would ensue. Any
act of negligence toward a woman, the effects of which are manifested in a subse-
quently-conceived infant would result in liability on the basis of Williams. Suppose
defendant's negligence renders plaintiff's father unable to fufill such paternal
duties as support. Perhaps the child could recover on the basis of Williams.
These are but a few of the problems raised by the Williams decision. If the
standards of the related cases are any indication, it would appear that Christine
Williams has not satisfied the administrative factor. There is no indication that fears
such as those expressed above are not well founded. As seen, courts generally are
slow to recognize a duty until they are satisfied that it has reasonable limits. The
New York Court of Claims was not justified in deviating from this established norm.
Jeffrey L. Smith-
4 6 GMMN, JuGE: AN Jmny, ch. 3, 4 (1930), first published, 28 CoLum. L. Rxv. 1014
(1928) and 29 COLUm. L. REv. 255 (1929). Professor Green lists five factors which
primarily influence the courts: the administrative factor, the ethical or moral factor, the
economic factor, the prophylactic or preventive factor, and the justice factor.
47 GREN, op. cit. supra note 46, at 77.
* Member, Third Year Class.
